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Abstract
Acute stress disorder (ASD) is a poorly understood and controversial diagnosis (Harvey & Bryant,
2002). The present study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the factor structure of the
most widely used self-report measure of ASD, the Acute Stress Disorder Scale, in a sample of
Hurricane Katrina evacuees relocated to a Red Cross emergency shelter in Austin, Texas. Results
indicated that the proposed four-factor structure did not fit the data well. However, an alternate 2-
factor model did fit the data well. This model included a second-order Distress factor (onto which
the Reexperiencing, Arousal, and Avoidance factors loaded strongly) that was positively correlated
with the Dissociation factor. Implications for the ASD construct and its measurement are discussed.
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Acute stress disorder (ASD) is a poorly understood and controversial diagnosis (Harvey &
Bryant, 2002). The nature, uniqueness, utility, and symptom structure of the disorder have been
called into question, and changes to its diagnostic criteria (in particular, deemphasizing the
role of dissociation; Bryant, 2007) are being considered for DSM-V. Some have even called
for ASD to be deleted from DSM-V altogether (e.g., Spitzer, First, & Wakefield, 2007).
However, very little empirical research has rigorously assessed ASD symptoms, and none have
subjected the theoretical symptom structure to statistical model testing. In the present study,
we examine the factor structure of ASD symptoms in a sample of individuals who were
temporarily residing in a Red Cross shelter in Austin, TX, having fled their homes in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This Category 3 hurricane, which made landfall in southeast
Louisiana on August 29, 2005, was one of the deadliest in US history. While Katrina left a trail
of destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas, the greatest damage and loss
of life occurred inNew Orleans, Louisiana, which flooded following catastrophic levee failures.
In the weeks following the disaster, thousands of evacuees were temporarily housed in over
470 Red Cross operated shelters and evacuation centers across the nation (see Brodie, Weltzien,
Altman, Blendon, & Benson, 2006; Mills, Edmondson, & Park, 2007).
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Acute stress disorder (ASD) was introduced into the diagnostic nomenclature in 1994 with the
publication of the 4th Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
ed.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). ASD describes stress
reactions occurring within the first month following a traumatic stressor (as defined by
Criterion A1 for posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD]) and represents an attempt to distinguish
acutely traumatized individuals likely to develop chronic PTSD from those experiencing more
normative and transient stress reactions (Harvey & Bryant, 2002).
As outlined in DSM-IV-TR, ASD is characterized by eight diagnostic criteria. First, for a
diagnosis of ASD to be considered, the individual must have experienced “intense fear,
helplessness, or horror” (APA, 2000) in response to the personal experience or witnessing of
an event involving extreme threat to the self or others (Criterion A). The individual must also
display at least three out of the five listed dissociative symptoms (i.e., numbing, reduction in
awareness of surroundings, derealization, depersonalization, and dissociative amnesia)
(Criterion B). Further, at least one symptom each of reexperiencing (i.e., recurring thoughts,
memories, dreams, or flashbacks) (Criterion C), avoidance of trauma-related stimuli (i.e.,
deliberately staying away from reminders of the trauma) (Criterion D), and anxiety or increased
arousal (i.e., increased autonomic nervous system activity) (Criterion E) must be present.
Symptoms must cause significant distress or functional impairment (Criterion F) and be present
for a minimum of two days within the first month posttrauma (Criterion G). Finally, the
disturbance must not be due to the effects of a substance or a general medical condition, or be
better accounted for by another psychological disorder (Criterion H).
Studies have found ASD prevalence rates of 10–20% in acutely traumatized individuals
(Brewin, Andrews, Rose, & Kirk, 1999; Bryant & Harvey, 1998; Harvey & Bryant, 1998).
Often viewed as “early PTSD,” the ASD diagnosis is appropriate only in the first four weeks
posttrauma, the timeframe during which PTSD cannot be diagnosed. Beyond this one-month
period, an ASD diagnosis can no longer be assigned, and a diagnosis of PTSD must instead be
considered. In addition to the difference in temporal windows, however, ASD also differs from
PTSD in its emphasis on dissociative phenomena. While PTSD is framed in terms of
reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal, ASD includes the additional criterion dedicated solely
to acute dissociative phenomena, described above. These dissociative symptoms represent a
major component of the ASD construct; the criterion of at least three such symptoms being
necessary for diagnosis is more than the number required in any other single symptom cluster.
This difference in emphasis is theoretical, based on the idea that acute trauma-related
dissociation impedes appropriate processing of traumatic memories and subsequent adaptation
to traumatic stress (Koopman, Classen, & Spiegel, 1994; Bryant, 2003).
Since its introduction, some have suggested that the lack of empirical evidence for ASD and
the reliance of the diagnosis on theoretical constructs hinder its usefulness (see Harvey &
Bryant, 2002, for a review). The diagnostic criteria for ASD are nearly identical to those for
PTSD, except for the focus on acute dissociation in ASD (which has been controversial from
the diagnosis’ conception; e.g., Marshall, Spitzer, & Liebowitz, 1999). Indeed, one of the
primary arguments for the utility of the diagnosis centers on its ability to predict subsequent
PTSD (Marshall et al., 1999).
However, recent research suggests that the ability of the ASD diagnosis to correctly identify
individuals who later develop PTSD may be limited. In terms of utility for predicting later
PTSD, prospective studies have shown that approximately 80% of trauma survivors meeting
ASD criteria go on to meet criteria for PTSD six months later (Brewin et al. Kirk, 1999; Bryant
& Harvey, 1998; Harvey & Bryant, 1998), and 75% to 80% 2 years posttrauma (Harvey &
Bryant, 2000, 1999). However, not all studies have found ASD diagnostic cutoffs useful in
prospectively predicting PTSD diagnosis (e.g., Fuglsang et al., 2004).
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Challenges to ASD scores’ predictive validity have been made concerning the sensitivity of
ASD to PTSD prediction (e.g., Creamer, O’Donnell, & Pattison, 2004). Also, some research
has shown that vulnerability and cognitive variables account for more variance than ASD
scores in PTSD diagnosis (Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007), and estimates of the
relationship of ASD to PTSD are heavily influenced by researchers’ decisions about whether
to include the dissociation features of the disorder in the ASD diagnosis (e.g., Harvey & Bryant,
1998; see Isserlin, Zerach, & Solomon, 2008, for a brief review). Given that the ASD diagnosis
is distinguished from the PTSD diagnosis only by timing and the inclusion of dissociation
symptoms, prediction of PTSD from ASD when dissociation symptoms are discounted
amounts to predicting PTSD symptoms after one month from PTSD symptoms slightly earlier.
In order to establish whether ASD is a worthwhile diagnosis, the purported symptom clusters
of ASD must be measured well. Further, the relationship between ASD dissociation symptoms
and those that mirror PTSD symptoms must be understood.
Research findings with regard to ASD have been undercut by a lack of diagnostic clarity. For
example, in some studies, ASD diagnosis has been determined by combining responses to
different measures in order to create a composite resembling the DSM-IV-TR criteria (Brewin
et al., 1999; Staab, Grieger, Fullerton, & Ursano, 1996). Other studies have utilized a structured
clinical interview (e.g.; Acute Stress Disorder Interview; Bryant, Harvey, Dang, & Sackville,
1998) or theStanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire (Cardena, Classen, & Spiegel,
1991).
The Acute Stress Disorder Scale
In an effort to address the lack of a gold standard in ASD assessment, Bryant, Moulds, and
Guthrie (2000) created the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS), a 19-item self-report inventory
based on ASD criteria as laid out by DSM-IV-TR. As is the case with the ASD diagnosis itself,
the aim of the ASDS is both the identification of ASD and prediction of risk for subsequent
PTSD. In previous research, ASDS scores have shown good reliability (Bryant, Moulds, &
Guthrie, 2000). In that study, test-retest reliability for scores over the course of 2 to 7 days was
high (r= .94 for two assessments), and internal consistency reliability was good for the full
scale (α= .96) and each of the subscales (α’s= .84 to .93). In terms of convergent validity, the
ASDS subscales scores have been shown to be strongly correlated (r’s= .69, Dissociation to .
84, Arousal) with corresponding subscales on the Acute Stress Disorder Interview (ASDI;
Bryant, Harvey, Dang, & Sackville, 1998), as both derive items directly from the DSM-IV-TR
ASD criteria. ASDS scores have also been strongly correlated with scores on a widely used
measure of PTSD symptomatology, the Impact of Events Scale (IES; Horowitz, Milner, &
Alvarez, 1979).
Since its introduction, the ASDS has been used in various populations, including individuals
referred to a PTSD clinic after exposure to varied trauma and survivors of an Australian bushfire
(Bryant et al., 2000), and of traffic accident survivors (Fuglsang et al., 2004). Based on previous
research using the ASDS, between 72% and 83% of those who develop ASD go on to meet
criteria for PTSD at 6 months posttrauma (Brewin et al., 1999; Bryant & Harvey, 1998) and
between 63% and 80% at 2 years posttrauma (Harvey & Bryant, 2002;Harvey & Bryant,
1999). Validation studies revealed that an ASDS cutoff score of 56 correctly identified 91%
of people who developed subsequent PTSD and 93% who did not (Bryant & Harvey, 2000).
This scoring method had predictive ability superior to a scheme more closely based on the
DSM-IV-TR criteria, in which a combined score of ≥ 9 was required for dissociative items.
To date, the ASDS has not been subjected to a rigorous statistical test of its factor structure, a
critical step in determining its utility for informing research and interventions. In addition, the
ASD construct has not been examined in a sample of disaster victims temporarily residing
together in an emergency shelter, a situation that has become increasingly common in the face
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of widescale disasters (American Red Cross, 2008). In fact, very few studies have assessed
ASD in survivors of the same traumatic event (cf. terrorist attack in Israel; Kutz & Dekel,
2006), and we know of none that have used the ASDS. Since the ASDS is designed to reflect
the diagnostic criteria for ASD, rigorously assessing the factor structure of the scale in a sample
such as this may shed light not only on the scale, but also on the construct itself.
The structure of posttraumatic stress
A few studies have employed exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to probe the structure of acute
(within one month post-trauma) posttraumatic stress responses. The initial report on the ASDS
included 2 principle components analyses, neither of which was entirely consistent with
symptom clusters set forth by DSM-IV; the first was conducted with accident and assault
survivors and suggested 3 factors. The first factor included all items from the Reexperiencing,
Arousal, and Avoidance subscales, the second consisted of all of the Dissociation items except
for amnesia, and the third was only the amnesia item. The second EFA was conducted with
brushfire survivors and suggested 4 factors that were not as coherent. In that analysis,
Dissociation items seemed to load together (though amnesia again did not load clearly with
the subscale), and Reexperiencing and Arousal items also seemed to load together. Thus, the
extent to which ASD (or the ASDS) reflects the dimensions specified by the DSM-IV-TR is
unclear.
It should be noted that the second of these factor analyses was conducted in a population with
heterogeneous trauma experiences, and both populations experienced varied concurrent
environmental influences on psychological well-being. The scale’s authors note that further
studies that include a range of trauma populations are needed to better understand the factor
structure of the ASD construct (Bryant et al., 2000). That is, it may be that different types of
traumatic experiences are differentially traumatic or more likely to elicit particular patterns of
symptoms (see Lancaster, Melka, & Rodriquez, 2009, for a brief discussion).
Cardena and colleagues (2000) reported an EFA of a related measure, the SASRQ, given to
187 firestorm survivors. That analysis did not include avoidance symptoms but suggested that
dissociation symptoms were a distinct factor and that reexperiencing and arousal symptoms
were largely distinct factors as well. Two of the items (i.e., “I would feel extremely upset if
exposed to events that would remind me of an aspect of the stressful event” and “I had a bodily
reaction when exposed to reminders of the traumatic event”) loaded on the reexperiencing
factor but could be construed as symptoms of arousal. It is notable in that study that only 2
percent of the sample reported amnesia, and the item did not load clearly on a single factor.
It is important to note that EFA is an exploratory data analysis technique that does not allow
statistical significance testing and is therefore not an ideal means for determining whether the
proposed factor structure of the scale fits the observed data. This shortcoming is particularly
important for the ASDS because the scale was designed to mirror the DSM-IV-TR criteria for
ASD. Thus, if the observed structure of the scale does not fit the diagnostic structure as specified
in the DSM-IV-TR, such a finding would hold implications for the construct itself.
Previous confirmatory factor analytic studies of posttraumatic stress responses are useful for
suggesting alternative models to the DSM-IV-TR model of ASD. A number of studies have
used CFA to examine the structure of PTSD, and those studies are pertinent given the extensive
symptom overlap between ASD and PTSD. While DSM-IV implies a three-factor model of
PTSD that includes intrusions, avoidance, and hyperarousal, many factor analytic studies have
not found support for such a model (see Asmundson, Stapleton, & Taylor, 2004, for a review).
Instead, a hierarchical two-factor model with an intrusions/avoidance first-order factor and a
hyperarousal/numbing first-order factor serving as indicators of a second-order PTSD factor
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has garnered empirical support (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 1998; Taylor, Kuch, Koch,
Crockett, & Passey, 1998).
In contrast, four-factor models of PTSD that more closely resemble the DSM-IV
conceptualization of ASD have found consistent support (e.g., King, Leskin, King, &
Weathers, 1998; Simms, Watson, & Doebbeling, 2002). The King et al. (1998) model includes
separate factors for intrusions, avoidance, hyperarousal, and emotional numbing (e.g., feeling
distant; in some ways, conceptually similar to dissociation in ASD), though another model
(Simms et al., 2002) combines symptoms of arousal and numbing. Most pertinent for the
present work is evidence that the structure of PTSD symptoms conforms to the four-factor
structure suggested by King et al. (1998) in elderly survivors of a 2004 Florida hurricane
(Schinka, Brown, Borenstein, & Mortimer, 2007) and in survivors of community violence
whose symptoms were assessed during the acute post-trauma period (Marshall, 2004). Thus,
to the extent that research on the structure of PTSD serves as a guide to assessment of the
structure of ASD, a four-factor model based on DSM-IV ASD criteria would appear to be a
reasonable starting point.
Recently, the first confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the structure of acute stress response
(Brooks, Silove, Bryant, O’Donnell, Creamer, & McFarlane, 2008) was conducted on data
from 587 patients hospitalized for traumatic injury, of whom 44 met criteria for ASD. The CFA
was conducted on responses to the Acute Stress Disorder Interview (ASDI; Bryant et al.,
1998) which, while consisting solely of dichotomous responses to queries concerning whether
a symptom is present or absent, comprises items that are nearly identical to the ASDS and that
are also based on DSM-IV criteria. The fit of the 4-factor CFA model was good, and the authors
held that the model was good evidence for the 4-factor structure of ASD suggested by DSM-
IV. However, correlations among the latent factors Reexperiencing, Avoidance, and Arousal
were all between .76 and .91, suggesting a lack of discriminant validity and perhaps the
presence of a second-order factor. Because Arousal and Dissociation were also correlated at .
77, the authors tested a model in which all four of the first-order latent factors were indicators
of a second-order general distress factor. Because the fit statistics for the two models seemed
highly similar, the authors opted for the more parsimonious model comprising 4-first order
factors. It should also be noted that the amnesia item did not load well onto the Dissociation
factor, but was retained in the model nonetheless.
The present study
The present study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the factor structure of the
ASDS in this sample of Hurricane Katrina evacuees relocated to a Red Cross emergency
shelter. This population is ideal for assessing the measurement of the ASD construct because
(a) all participants experienced the same trauma (albeit at different levels of exposure), (b) all
participants completed the ASDS within the same eight-day window after the experience, and
(c) all participants were residing in the same shelter at the time of measurement, limiting
environmental dilution of the effects of the traumatic exposure.
In all, we tested three CFA models of the ASDS. Given the paucity of factor analytic studies
to date on the structure of ASD in adults, no particular a priori factor structure hypothesis is
strongly supported by previous empirical evidence. However, based on the DSM-IV theoretical
model and the Brooks et al. (2008) ASDI CFA results, we chose to first test the four-factor
structure implied by the four ASD symptom clusters and the four ASDS subscales that reflect
them (Model 1; Figure 1). Based on the second EFA of the initial report on the ASDS and
empirical considerations from the results of the results of Model 1, we next tested a 3-factor
structure in which Reexperiencing and Arousal loaded onto a second-order Distress factor, and
Avoidance and Dissociation were separate first-order factors (Model 2; Figure 2). Based on
theoretical assertions that Dissociation is a predictor of posttraumatic response rather than a
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true component of that response, consistent evidence across ASD factor analytic studies
suggesting that Dissociation is distinct from the other factors that constitute posttraumatic stress
response in the acute period, and empirical considerations from the results of Models 1 and 2,
we then tested a 2-factor structure in which Reexperiencing, Arousal, and Avoidance loaded




132 adult evacuees (56% men, 44% women; mean age of 43 years; range, 20–80 years) from
New Orleans and surrounding parishes comprised the sample. Reported racial identification
was 74.2% Black, 16.7% non-Hispanic White, 3% multiracial, 1.7% Hispanic, and 2.4%
“other.” Eighty-one percent reported a high school diploma or higher, with 22% having
completed college or an advanced degree. Income of participants was reported as less than
$10,000 (37%), between $10, 000 and $30, 000 (45%) and greater than $30,000 (18%). When
given a list of self- or physician-diagnosed mental health problems they may have ever
experienced, 47% of all participants reported a previous psychiatric condition (depression,
33%; anxiety, 21%; bipolar disorder, 8%; schizophrenia, 4%; PTSD, 3%; other, 3%), with the
distribution of diagnoses evincing a similar pattern across income levels. The sample has been
described in greater detail elsewhere (Mills, Edmondson, & Park, 2007).
Sampling and Data Collection
Data collection occurred 12–19 days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall outside New
Orleans. Data were collected at the Austin Convention Center, which housed approximately
1600 Hurricane Katrina evacuees. Shelter access was granted to the researchers by the City of
Austin and Travis County Emergency Medical Services. Survey booths were set up in 4
different locations within the shelter to increase researcher visibility and to provide a sample
that best represented the shelter population. Data were obtained anonymously; therefore,
written informed consent was waived. All participants received information in written and
verbal form regarding the purpose, risks, and benefits of study participation in compliance with
the University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board.
Measures
Acute Stress Disorder symptoms were assessed with the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS;
Bryant et al., 2000), a self-report inventory consisting of 19 items based on criteria for ASD
as defined by the DSM-IV-TR TR (APA, 2000). The ASDS contains 4 subscales asked in
response to a specific event: Dissociation (5 items; e.g., “During or after Katrina, did you ever
feel numb or distant from your emotions?”), Reexperiencing (4 items; e.g., “Have memories
of the hurricane kept entering your mind?”), Avoidance (4 items; e.g., “Have you tried not to
think about Hurricane Katrina?”), and Arousal (6 items; e.g., “When you are reminded of the
disaster, do you sweat or tremble, or does your heart beat fast?”). Participants are asked the
extent to which they experienced each item since the Hurricane Katrina disaster. All items are
answered on a response scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Cronbach’s alpha for the
entire scale in this sample was .92.
Data analysis
First, using AMOS 16 (Arbuckle, 2007), a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using maximum
likelihood estimation was conducted to test the 4-factor model of acute stress disorder as
suggested by the four ASDS subscales. Second, an alternative 3-factor model that included a
second-order Distress factor (comprised of the Reexperiencing and Arousal factors) correlated
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with the Avoidance and Dissociation factors was tested. Third, an alternative 2-factor model
that included a second-order Distress factor (comprised of the Reexperiencing, Arousal, and
Avoidance factors) correlated with the Dissociation factor was tested.
Multiple fit indices were used to assess model fit, and their standard cutoff recommendations
(Hu & Bentler, 1999) were employed. The model chi-square statistic was used to determine
the fit of each model to the observed data (Bollen, 1989). A non-significant model chi-square
(p >.05) suggests good model fit, as it indicates that the model does not differ significantly
from the observed data (Kline, 2005). The comparative fit index (CFI) and root-mean-square
error of approximation (RMSEA) are based on the non-centrality parameter, and were also
used to assess the fit of each model. A CFI greater than .95 and an RMSEA of .05 or less
suggest good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The PClose statistic was also used; a PClose value less
than .05 suggests that RMSEA is significantly greater than its suggested cutoff of .05 (i.e., test
of close fit). Aside from the use of standard measures of model fit, the Akaike Information
Criterion, AIC (Akaike, 1974), was used to compare the fit of non-nested models. The model
with the lower AIC is the preferred model because it possesses better balance of model fit and
parsimony. Modification indexes were used to respecify CFAs in order to isolate covariance
between measurement errors and improve model fit.
Diagnostic tests were performed in AMOS 16 (Arbuckle, 2007) to assess whether the data met
the requisite normality assumptions of CFA. We reran each model using a bootstrapping
method to obtain a Bollen-Stine corrected probability (p) value. Bootstrapping is an approach
for estimating standard errors in regression analyses without making any distributional
assumptions (Chernick, 1999). This process involves repeatedly resampling the sample
population with replacement to approximate what would happen if the entire population were
sampled. The number of bootstrap samples drawn for each analysis was set to 2000. The
multivariate normality critical ratios were greater than 2.0, indicating multivariate non-
normality of the data. Thus, we also report the Bollen-Stine corrected p values for each model.
As with the traditional chi square test of model fit, nonsignificant Bollen-Stine corrected p
values suggest good model fit.
Missing Data
Prior to conducting confirmatory factor analyses, missing data (4–7 cases on any given item,
15 cases listwise) were replaced using stochastic regression imputation in AMOS 16. This
method uses multiple regression to predict missing data points by using available raw data
points as predictors, then reintroduces random variability into the imputed data (Little &
Schenker, 1995).
Power
Statistical power for the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) test of close fit
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993) was calculated on 146 df (Model 1) (also on 120 df; Model 3) and
n=132 with the null hypothesis that RMSEA = .05 and the alternative RMSEA = .08
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996) using Preacher and Coffman’s (2006) code for
calculating power in the R statistical package. Power for the test of close fit in Model 1 was
sufficient at .91, and the lowest power was for Model 3 (.86), which was also sufficient. The
PClose statistic represents the test of statistical significance (p value) associated with the test
of close fit.
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Description of ASDS Scores
The mean ASDS score for the sample was 61.61 [SD=19.38; Skew= −.28 (.21); Kurtosis= −.
78 (.42)]. Scores ranged from 19 (lowest possible) to 95 (highest possible). Seventy-nine
percent (n= 102) met criteria for ASD according to the scoring method that privileges
dissociation symptoms as suggested by the scale’s authors (Bryant et al., 2000). Sixty-two
percent (n= 81) of participants had scores greater than the suggested cutoff for PTSD prediction
of 56 (Harvey & Bryant, 2000). Correlations among the ASDS scale items are given in Table
1.
Model 1: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for a 4-factor ASDS
The CFA for the 4-factor ASDS showed that the proposed 4-factor structure of the scale was
not a good fit to the data, χ2 (146) = 310.76, p< .01; χ2/df= 2.13; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.
02; CFI= .86; RMSEA= .09 (90% CI= .08–.11); AIC= 436.76. Upon examination of the
parameter estimates and standardized residuals, however, the lack of fit appeared to be caused
by a lack of discriminant validity between the Reexperiencing and Arousal factors (r= .84) and
the Reexperiencing and Avoidance factors (r= .71), a problematic indicator of the Dissociation
factor (i.e., amnesia for the trauma, β= .31), as well as from unspecified covariance among
indicators’ measurement error. Modifications to the 4-factor CFA were attempted using
modification indexes. Covariance was specified between measurement error in items within
the same factor only. Five significant correlations between measurement error terms were
retained in the model: between error in items 1–2; 1–5; 11–12; 12–13; 18–19 (r’s= .17 to .46;
see Table 1 for item content). However, after those modifications, the model was still not an
acceptable fit to the data, χ2 (141) = 242.33, p< .01; χ2/df= 1.72; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.
14; CFI= .91; RMSEA= .07 (90% CI= .06–.09; PClose= .01); AIC= 340.33. Also, the
correlations among Reexperiencing and Arousal (r= .84) and Reexperiencing and Avoidance
(r= .75) continued to suggest a lack of discriminant validity.
Model 2: Confirmatory factor analysis for a 3-factor ASDS with a second-order factor
For the 3-factor CFA model, a second-order distress factor whose indicators were the first-
order factors Reexperiencing (scaling indicator) and Arousal was specified. Correlations
between measurement errors previously suggested by modification indexes and incorporated
into the four-factor model were retained.1 Model fit was essentially unchanged from the four-
factor model, χ2 (142) = 242.35, p< .01; χ2/df= 1.71; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.14; CFI= .
92; RMSEA= .07 (90% CI= .06–.09; PClose= .01); AIC= 338.35. Model misspecification
included a lack of discriminant validity between the second-order Distress factor and the first-
order Avoidance factor, as well as unspecified covariance among measurement errors.
Modification indexes that suggested specifying correlations between measurement error in
indicators of Reexperiencing and Arousal items were accepted, as the two first-order factors
were now specified as indicators of a second-order factor. Four additional significant
correlations between measurement error terms were retained in the model: between error in
items 6–15; 7–15; 9–16; 9–19 (r’s= −.27 to .19; see Table 1 for item content). Even with the
correlations among measurement errors, the CFA for the 3-factor ASDS with Reexperiencing
and Arousal factors loaded onto a second-order Distress factor was not an acceptable fit to the
data, χ2 (138) = 221.82, p< .01; χ2/df= 1.61; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.25; CFI= .93;
RMSEA= .07 (90% CI= .05–.08; PClose= .04); AIC= 325.82, but was a significant
improvement on Model 1, as indicated by its lower AIC value. Upon examination of the
1Model fit was poor for Model 2 when the error covariance respecifications to Model 1 were not included, χ2 (147) = 301.33, p< .01;
χ2/df= 2.05; CFI= .87; RMSEA= .09 (90% CI= .08–.10; PClose= .001); AIC= 387.33.
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parameter estimates and standardized residuals, however, the lack of fit appeared to be caused
by the continued poor performance of Item 5 on the Dissociation factor, a lack of discriminant
validity between the second-order Distress factor and the Arousal factor (r= .78), and
unspecified covariance among indicators’ measurement error across the Avoidance, Arousal,
and Reexperiencing factors.
Model 3: Confirmatory factor analysis for a 2-factor ASDS with a second-order factor
In specifying the 2-factor CFA model, correlations between measurement errors previously
suggested by modification indexes were retained.2 The CFA for the 2-factor ASDS with
Avoidance, Reexperiencing, and Arousal factors loaded onto a second-order Distress factor
which was correlated with Dissociation was initially not a good fit to the data, χ2 (139) = 225.77,
p< .01; χ2/df= 1.62; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.23; CFI= .93; RMSEA= .07 (90% CI= .05–.
09; PClose= .03); AIC= 327.77. However, modification indexes suggested correlating error
terms across indicators of the first-order Avoidance factor and the other two first-order factors
indicating Distress. Four additional significant correlations between measurement error terms
were retained in the model: between error in items 6–11; 6–13; 13–16; 13–14 (r’s=.17 to .26;
see Table 1 for item content). The final model was fit the data reasonably well, χ2 (135) =
199.89, p< .01; χ2/df= 1.48; Bollen-Stine bootstrap χ2 p=.40; CFI= .95; RMSEA= .06 (90%
CI= .04–.08; PClose= .16); AIC= 309.88, and its lower AIC value suggested a significantly
better fit than Model 2. The three factors that served as indicators of Distress each had
standardized loadings on the second-order factor at .75–.98, and the second-order Distress
factor was correlated with Dissociation at .66 (Figure 3).3
Discussion
Two major criticisms of the ASD diagnosis are that it is based on a theoretical construct rather
than empirical evidence of the disorder it purports to describe (see Harvey & Bryant, 2002, for
a review), and it elevates a risk factor for PTSD (i.e., dissociation) to a core feature of a new
disorder (Marshall et al., 1999). The ASDS is a self-report measure based on the four-factor
theoretical ASD construct that has not heretofore been subjected to a rigorous examination of
its proposed four-factor structure. The present study assessed the factor structure of the ASDS
and found that the proposed four-factor structure (Model 1) was not a good fit to the observed
data in this sample. However, a 2-factor model that included a second-order Distress factor
(Model 3), on which Reexperiencing, Arousal, and Avoidance loaded strongly, which
correlated moderately strongly with a 4-item Dissociation factor fit the data well. In that model,
a great deal of the variance in the first-order Reexperiencing, Arousal, and Avoidance factors
was explained by the higher-order Distress factor, and error in a number of their indicators was
correlated across those three first-order factors. This suggests that, in the immediate wake of
a severe traumatic experience, the ASDS appears to capture the degree of distress and PTSD-
like symptoms that respondents are feeling, as well as a distinct set of dissociative symptoms.
However, distinctions between first-order factors corresponding to symptoms of
reexperiencing, arousal, and avoidance are much less clear, as the three first-order factors seem
to constitute a higher-order phenomenon. Our findings could reflect problems in the ASD
construct itself, the measurement of ASD using the ASDS, or the expression or measurement
of ASD in this particular population under these extreme circumstances.
2Model fit was poor for Model 3 when the error covariance respecifications to Model 2 were not included, χ2 (148) = 304.09, p< .01;
χ2/df= 2.05; CFI= .87; RMSEA= .09 (90% CI= .08–.10; PClose= .001); AIC= 388.08.
3Based on a reviewer’s suggestion, we also tested a model in which the three first-order factors were collapsed so that all items loaded
directly on a first-order Distress factor that was correlated with the Dissociation factor. That model was a poor fit to the data, χ2 (135) =
254.50, p< .01; χ2/df= 1.89; CFI= .90; RMSEA= .08 (90% CI= .07–.10; PClose= .001); AIC= 364.49.
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If our findings are interpreted as indicative of problems with the ASD construct, then the two-
factor structure we observed may somewhat strengthen theoretically-based claims that ASD’s
dissociation component should be discarded in future conceptualizations of acute stress
response. That is, given that dissociation is distinct from the core symptoms of PTSD that
comprise the rest of the ASD construct, and its inclusion seems to impair prediction of later
PTSD relative to prediction models including only the other three subscales (i.e., a major
justification for establishing the diagnosis; e.g., Harvey & Bryant, 1998; also see Isserlin,
Zerach, & Solomon, 2008, for a brief review), then perhaps it is indeed better thought of as a
predictor of posttraumatic stress response rather than a diagnostic feature of ASD. Of course,
without the dissociation component, ASD differs little from PTSD aside from the timing of
the diagnosis vis-à-vis the traumatic event.
We believe that the lack of distinction between the three first-order symptom factors that
comprised the Distress factor may have important implications for the ASD construct, as well
as its measurement. First, the possibility that the symptom clusters proposed to constitute ASD
are not distinct should be considered. It is possible that in the peri-traumatic period (i.e., the
period immediately around the trauma), distinct symptom clusters have not yet arisen, but
would become distinct for those who go on to develop PTSD. This interpretation might also
hold important implications for understanding why peri-traumatic dissociation is among the
strongest and most consistently reported peri-traumatic predictors of later PTSD (Ozer et al.,
2003), given that dissociation seems to be the only distinct symptom cluster. However, it should
also be noted that in a recent multi-site study of ASD to PTSD prediction, cutoff scores on the
Arousal subscale showed the best sensitivity and specificity for subsequent PTSD diagnosis
(Bryant, Creamer, O’Donnell, Silove, & McFarlane, 2008).
One could also make the case that the three symptom clusters that loaded onto the second-order
Distress factor actually comprise early PTSD symptoms. In that interpretation, dissociation is
merely a related phenomenon that may occur alongside PTSD symptoms within the first month
post-trauma. If that is the case, then models predicting PTSD symptoms from ASDS scores
show stronger relationships when dissociation is not considered because such models predict
subsequent PTSD symptoms from the very same PTSD symptoms measured within the first
month post-trauma. In this scenario, those relationships are better thought of as estimates of
PTSD symptom stability.
In terms of the measurement of ASD using the ASDS, the measure itself seems to perform
fairly well across studies, and its factor structure may be more consistent than the initial report’s
EFAs (Bryant et al., 2000) would suggest. In relation to other studies that used the ASDS, we
found a high mean score for the full scale, 61.61 (SD=19.38), as compared to a mean of 44.65
(SD=15.45) for family members of critical care patients (Auerbach et al., 2007), 44.93
(SD=22.24) for accident and assault victims referred to a PTSD clinic (Bryant et al., 2000),
and 65.00 (SD=15.50) and 66.46 (SD=13.21) for accident and assault victims diagnosed with
ASD (Nixon et al., 2008)]. This major discrepancy between sample mean scores without a
corresponding discrepancy in score variance suggests that the ASDS is sensitive to a broad
range of acute stress responses, and likely reflects both the horrific nature of Katrina and her
aftermath and the homogeneity of participants’ experiences during the ordeal (see Mills et al.,
2007).
In comparison to the only other CFA of ASD symptoms (i.e., using the ASDI; Brooks et al.,
2008), our findings for model fit, factor loadings, and intercorrelations among factors were
remarkably similar. The similarity is remarkable in that the samples in the two studies were
markedly different and the responses on the ASDI are dichotomous, so measurement error in
the indicators is not directly comparable to that of our continuous self-report indicators. As in
Brooks et al. (2008), our final model fit reasonably well, all of the indicators loaded on their
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respective factors at expected magnitudes except for Item 5 (amnesia; discussed below), and
the three non-Dissociation factors were very highly correlated. Our results differ from Brooks
et al. (2008) in that our four-factor model of ASD was not a good fit to the data (in part due to
unspecified covariance among measurement error that may not have been present to the same
degree in the ASDI’s dichotomous indicators), and we did not accept models in which factors
were so highly correlated as to suggest a lack of discriminant validity. Thus, while the
relationships between the DSM-IV first-order factors and their indicators, as well as among
first-order factors, were very similar across our study and Brooks et al. (2008), we believe that
our model represents a better estimate of the latent structure of ASD by explicitly modeling
the higher-order factor that we believe was present in Brooks et al. (2008).
At the subscale level, most of the indicators performed well. As in Brooks et al. (2008), the
only major problem was the dissociative amnesia item of the dissociation subscale (i.e., “Have
you been unable to recall important aspects of the disaster?”), a result that was not unexpected
given its performance in the initial investigation of the scale (Bryant et al., 2000), as well as
that of a similar item in studies investigating the factor structure of PTSD (e.g., Palmieri,
Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007). However, measurement errors among items within each of
the subscales (except for reexperiencing) were correlated in the present study. For instance,
the measurement errors in the two items of the Dissociation factor that tap perceptual
irregularities were moderately correlated, suggesting that another latent construct may have
been present. While this is not the only plausible explanation, competing explanations such as
the presence of shared method variance seem unlikely given that all items represent self-
reported symptoms modeled directly on DSM-IV-TR criteria.
This limitation, along with the problematic dissociative amnesia item, suggests that the
dissociation subscale (as originally proposed) might be particularly weak as a distinct, unified
construct. This further legitimizes controversy over the reliance on dissociative symptoms for
the diagnosis of ASD (e.g., Marshall et al., 1999), and arguments that such reliance may inhibit
the predictive power of ASD to subsequent PTSD (Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007).
With respect to the possibility that our results were substantially influenced by the population
and extreme circumstances from which these data arise, we cannot know the extent to which
the measurement issues revealed by these analyses were simply due to unique characteristics
of this sample, such as the residence of participants together in a temporary community of
fellow survivors or being involved in a highly publicized and political tragedy (Brinkley,
2006). However, it behooves trauma researchers to consider the potential implications of these
findings for ASD. We believe it is unlikely that our results merely reveal ASDS measurement
problems, given that the items are modeled directly on DSM-IV ASD criteria and that the factor
structure of the ASDS conforms so closely to that of the ASDI. We believe that it is more likely
that these findings reflect difficulties with the construct of ASD itself. If our results are
replicated by researchers studying ASD in other samples, it will be necessary to revisit this
diagnostic classification and revise it to conform to the symptoms as they exist in samples of
individuals recently exposed to trauma (or discard the diagnosis entirely). Revisions in
measurement or diagnostic categorization will lead to a better understanding of the immediate
and short-term impact of trauma and may lead to a better understanding of longer-term
adjustment trajectories as well.
Limitations of this study must be acknowledged. While it is not unusual, given the difficulty
associated with obtaining such data, for factor analytic studies of acute posttraumatic responses
to have fewer participants than ideal (e.g., 120 Spanish speakers, Marshall, 2004; 142 breast
cancer survivors, Cordova et al., 2000), the rule of thumb most often stated for sample size in
CFA is 200 (Hoelter, 1983). Thus, an awareness of the potential influence of small sample size
when interpreting of our results is warranted. Our sample size was smaller than ideal, especially
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given our use of confirmatory factor analysis, however, artificially nonsignificant x2 values
(artificial good fit) are associated with smaller sample sizes (Kline, 2005). That is, a significant
x2 suggesting poor model fit is less likely when sample size is small (Kim, 2005), so it is
particularly unlikely that sample size was the reason that the four-factor model we tested was
not a good fit to the data. The other fit indices we used for the four-factor model are not as
heavily influenced by sample size (Bollen, 1990). Indeed, our power estimates for the RMSEA
test of close fit suggested that our study possessed ample power to determine whether our
models were a close fit to the data. The sample size therefore appeared adequate to examine
the fit of the four-factor model, and the within-subscale measurement issues discussed above
appear responsible for the poor model fit we observed. Further, the 2-factor model which we
found to be a good fit to the data conforms well with one diagnostic use of the scale suggested
by its authors (i.e., privilege the dissociation scale in diagnosis while scoring the other subscales
together, Bryant et al., 2000) and with previous critiques concerning dissociation’s tangential
relationship to the rest of the scale in ASD to PTSD prediction models (Harvey & Bryant,
1998), and was remarkably similar to the ASDI CFA discussed above.
Another cautionary note concerns our use of modification indexes to improve model fit through
allowing measurement error in indicators within each latent variable to covary. This is
potentially problematic for two reasons. First, modification indexes are sample specific and
may capitalize on chance covariance to improve fit. Future research should validate the
intercorrelations we specified in an independent but comparable sample. Second, although the
ability to explicitly model error covariance is a strength of CFA, it is generally preferable to
set error covariances to 0 rather than to allow them to covary at all. Also, when error covariances
are specified, they should be theoretically justified. Aside from the error covariance discussed
above within the Dissociation factor, two primary theoretically justifiable patterns of error
covariance were specified within the higher-order Distress factor. First, error in items tapping
uncontrollable cognitive sequelae of trauma (i.e. intrusive memories, concentration deficits,
and insomnia) covaried with error in items tapping efforts to control triggers for those
symptoms (i.e., avoidance of talking about, being reminded of, or feeling emotions related to
the trauma). Second, error in the item tapping subjective distress at reminders of the trauma
covaried with error in items tapping evidence of distress (i.e., physiological reactivity and
concentration deficits). We believe that the error covariances we allowed to vary were
theoretically justifiable, and that our strategy of only specifying covariances among error in
indicators that comprised a shared higher-order factor strengthens the case for allowing those
covariances to vary. However, we are aware that many find specification of error covariances
problematic.
A further limitation is that participants in this study were survivors of a very specific, complex,
publicized, and ongoing (at the time of measurement) traumatic event, the features of which
may have uniquely influenced the presentation of ASD in the sample. We also were unable to
follow these individuals over time, so we are unable to speak to the issue of how well the ASDS
predicted PTSD in our sample.
In spite of these limitations, the present findings represent the most thorough examination of
the factor structure of the ASDS to date and provide important information on this scale, which
has implications for the ASD construct itself. Future research is needed to expand this line of
research, potentially by revising either how the ASD construct is generally measured or how
it is theorized to express itself in the special case of victims of mass trauma such as natural
disasters. Indeed, future research is needed to determine the utility of the diagnostic category
itself.
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Model 1: Diagram of Model 1, a four-factor CFA of the ASDS.
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Model 2: Diagram of Model 2, a three-factor CFA of the ASDS.
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Model 3: Model 3, the final two-factor CFA of the ASDS. Bold, italicized values represent
proportion of variance explained in the latent variable. All other values represent standardized
parameter estimates with their corresponding standard error in parentheses. Arrows represent
factor loadings, curved lines represent correlations. Factor loadings marked with an asterisk
represent marker variables fixed to 1.
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